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GERALD FORD, THE NIXON PARDON, AND THE 
RISE OF THE RIGHT 
LAURA KALMAN∗ 
Much recent scholarship about the United States since World War II has focused 
on the liberal consensus.  Historians have suggested that everyone we wrote about—
from Franklin Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson, Adolf Berle to Abe Fortas, Hugo Black 
to Allard Lowenstein—personified the promise and paradoxes of liberalism and 
asked when and why that liberal consensus faltered.1  Some contend that liberalism 
unraveled at the end of the 1960s because policymakers overpromised in the realm 
of social justice and did not deliver, and Vietnam raised questions about the wisdom 
of their global vision.2  Others blame Richard Nixon for polarizing the United 
States.3  Still others say the racial politics and cleavages we associated with its 
backlash predated the 1960s and were rooted in the very rights-consciousness that 
was supposedly at the heart of post-World War II liberalism.4 
Meanwhile, when conservatives write their history, they argue the tide turned in 
their favor in 1964 when Barry Goldwater wrested the Republican nomination from 
Nelson Rockefeller.  Add to that Nixon’s victories in 1968 and 1972, and Watergate 
becomes a bump in the road towards Ronald Reagan’s inevitable 1980 victory.5  
Valuable as all these interpretations are, they downplay the survival of liberalism 
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past the 1960s and ignore the extent to which liberalism and conservatism have 
coexisted in modern America.   
Perhaps more than the 1960s, the early 1970s marked the high water mark of the 
liberal consensus.6  Roe v. Wade, which grounded the right to abortion in the right to 
privacy, represented the apex of rights-based liberalism and perpetuated the division 
between public and private, a crucial facet to liberalism.7  As President, Nixon often 
governed liberally even though he talked conservatively, and thus many 
conservatives regarded him as a traitor.8  The rise of the modern Republican Party 
and the right was highly contingent: When Nixon resigned, both the Republican 
Party and conservatives seemed even more divided, endangered, and mired in 
scandal than they did after the 2008 election of President Barack Obama.9  In this 
Article, I discuss a critical time for those forces and the rule of law, the first month 
of the Ford Presidency. 
In 1974, it seemed as if everyone wanted to go to law school.  Over 135,000 
LSATs had been administered in 1973-74, almost double compared to any year 
during the 1960s.10  Yet, so many of those involved in the Watergate cover-up were 
lawyers that Time magazine claimed “there ha[d] been no comparable conspiracy of 
lawyers in [all] history.”11 
In the White House, in August 1974, one lawyer prepared to resign the 
Presidency to avoid impeachment and another prepared to assume it.  The 
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confirmation battle can do for them what the Panama Canal treaty fight did for them in the 
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resemblance ended there.  Brilliant, cunning, secretive, and insecure Nixon divided 
the world into friends and enemies.  In contrast, Ford thrived on camaraderie, 
conciliation and compromise.12  By the time Ford was in the seventh grade, he had 
developed his philosophy of life: “Everyone, I decided, had more good qualities than 
bad.  If I understood and tried to accentuate those good qualities in others, I could 
get along much better.”13  
Ford’s sunny outlook fueled his rise in Congress.  When Spiro Agnew resigned 
the Vice-Presidency in disgrace, Nixon reluctantly tapped Ford as the only 
Republican acceptable to the Democratic Congress.14  The most damning complaint 
in Ford’s FBI file was that he once tackled someone in a football game after the 
whistle that signaled the end of play blew.15  Ford was decent and engagingly 
humble: he said he was “a Ford, not a Lincoln.”16 
Ford’s modesty seemed fitting.  He had graduated in the top quarter of his class 
from University of Michigan, where he was also a football star and in the top quarter 
of his class at Yale Law School.17  Nonetheless, he seemed neither articulate nor 
bright.18  As Lyndon Johnson famously remarked, “Ford’s the only man I ever knew 
who can’t chew gum and fart at the same time.”19  Ford often misspoke, as when he 
toasted President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and “the great people of the government of 
Israel” Sadat led.20  Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield said that Ford has 
“had a remarkable career because he has been so unremarkable himself.”21 
Yet, as Ford became President on August 9, 1974, his ordinariness and 
“accentuate the positive” philosophy was welcome.22  Presidents since Theodore 
Roosevelt had so increased the power of the office that it had been commonplace to 
speak of an “imperial Presidency.”23  Ford, with his modest virtues, seemed 
incapable of doing anything but cutting down the Presidency to the right size.24  
                                                          
 
12
 Gerald Ford: American Presidents Exclusive Gerald Ford Biography, 
http://www.american-presidents.com/gerald-ford [hereinafter “Exclusive Biography”]. 
 
13
 GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD 46 (l979). 
 
14
 Richard A. Ryan, 38th President from Grand Rapids restored honor to White House, 
DET. NEWS, Dec. 27, 2006, http://detnews.com/article/20061227/NATION/612270413. 
 
15
 ROBERT T. HARTMANN, PALACE POLITICS: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE FORD YEARS 73 
n.* (1980). 
 
16
 FORD, supra note 13, at 112. 
 
17
 Id. at 53, 56. 
 
18
 Exclusive Biography, supra note 12.  
 
19
 HARTMANN, supra note 15, at 30. 
 
20
 Id. at 279. 
 
21
 ‘The Fords from Grand Rapids,’ 219 THE NATION, Aug. 31, 1974, at 132. 
 
22
 Exclusive Biography, supra note 12. 
 
23
 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1 (1973). 
 
24
 Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1999). 
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Ford struck just the right note in his inaugural address.25  Watergate actually 
raised a number of constitutional questions that Nixon’s resignation left 
unanswered.26  But, when Ford said the lesson of Watergate was that “our 
Constitution works” and that “our great Republic is a Government of laws and not of 
men,” he voiced a misperception at once widely shared and deeply comforting.27  
Acknowledging the “internal wounds of Watergate” were “more painful and . . . 
poisonous than those of foreign wars,” Ford pleaded to “let brotherly love purge our 
hearts of suspicion and of hate.”28  In all, he mentioned love three times, God four.29  
Ford’s best line that confronted Watergate and promised to end the era: “My fellow 
Americans, our long national nightmare is over.”30 
After Ford's acclaimed speech, Americans could indeed contemplate the end to 
their Watergate nightmare and the beginning of healing.  In part, it was relative.  
Anyone seemed better than Nixon.31  But, Ford really did seem to represent a 
substantive improvement, particularly in his use of symbols to remind Americans 
that he was Everyman.32 
Nixon never wanted Americans to see him as one of them.  So uncomfortable did 
Nixon become at state dinners that he reduced them to fifty-eight minutes.  As part 
of this effort, he banished the soup course, announcing that “men don't really like 
soup.”33  Ford, however, was easy and hospitable.34  He substituted the “Michigan 
Fight Song” for “Hail to the Chief.”35  Nixon invited Democrats and reporters that he 
had labeled “enemies” to his first state dinner.36  The public and reporters went wild 
when they learned Ford was toasting his own English muffins.37  A New Yorker 
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cartoon featured a sleepy wife reminding her irate husband that “[t]he President of 
the United States of America makes his own breakfast.”38 
Ford even seemed ready to rise above his own conservatism.  He told liberals to 
“forget” his voting record, which reflected the need to satisfy Michigan 
constituents.39  The secretary to the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus 
was so surprised to hear the President was on the phone that she thought it was a 
practical joke. 40  But, it was Ford on the phone, inviting caucus members by the 
White House for a chat, an invitation he repeated to Bella Abzug and feminists to 
whom he promised to fight for the Equal Rights Amendment.41  
During Ford’s second week as President, he took action by highlighting his 
desire for national reconciliation and testified to the power liberal rhetoric retained in 
Washington.  Key Congressional Republicans urged him to sound liberal, “to 
continue the healing,” to avoid divisive issues like busing.42  They reminded him that 
“the President must represent all the people, including the poor and black . . . 
deserters and draft dodgers.”43 
Nixon’s determination to protect his Vietnam policy had followed him down the 
road to Watergate,44 and he had stressed the need to punish war resisters.45  In his 
first show of leadership, Ford decided on a different approach.46  He would make his 
position public, he resolved, not before a welcoming liberal audience, but a resistant 
conservative one.47  Standing before thousands of stunned veterans of foreign wars, 
Ford reminded them that he had spoken of justice and mercy in his inaugural address 
and threw “the weight of my Presidency . . . on the side of leniency” and conditional 
amnesty.48 
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Next, Ford named his Vice President.  Most Republicans listed Republican 
National Committee Chair George Bush as their first choice, and Bush wanted the 
job.49  But, some on Ford’s staff thought his selection would seem “weak and 
depressingly conventional [partisan] act.”50  So, Ford chose Governor Rockefeller of 
New York, conservative Republicans’ anti-Christ.51 
Since Franklin Roosevelt relieved Herbert Hoover, the national mood did not so 
quickly change.  Democrats and many Republicans fell over themselves to say Ford 
had replaced “[the] national frown with a national smile.”52  According to the 
Washington Post, Ford was “the most normal, sane, down-to-earth individual to 
work in the Oval Office since Harry Truman left.”53  (Truman, who had been reviled 
when he departed from Washington, became a popular hero to Democrats and 
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52
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Republicans at just this moment).54  Americans rooted for Ford.55  “I do not want a 
good honeymoon,” he told Congress, but “a good marriage.”56  The honeymoon, 
however, was great.57  Though every President gets one, there was something special 
about Ford’s honeymoon.  People wanted desperately to believe that someone could 
heal the wounds of Watergate and Vietnam.58  
In these first happy days of the Ford Administration, the fiercest hostility toward 
the new President seemed to lie inside the White House.  Criminal charges related to 
Watergate had already dispatched many, but about four-hundred-and-eighty Nixon 
men remained.59  Ford’s transition team, headed by Donald Rumsfeld, wanted him to 
clean house.60  But, the President desired continuity and disapproved of a “purge.”61  
He begged everyone, especially Nixon’s last Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, to stay 
on the job.62  A skilled infighter and Nixon loyalist, Haig frustrated Ford’s every 
effort to step out of Nixon’s shadow.63 
As Ford assumed the Presidency, he faced two troubling questions about his 
predecessor that Haig and other holdovers sought to influence.  What should Ford do 
about the former President and his records—the forty-six million pages of paper and 
the nine-hundred and fifty reels of tape on which Nixon had recorded his 
conversations?  Named an unindicted co-conspirator by the Watergate grand jury, 
Nixon had been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in the upcoming trials of his 
Administration officials and feared he himself might yet be indicted for obstruction 
of justice.64  As Nixon prepared his testimony (and looked ahead to paying his 
lawyers by writing his memoirs), he “desperately” wanted access to the tapes.65 
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The White House wanted to be unaffiliated with the Watergate scandal.  “Get 
Nixon materials out of White House as soon as possible,” Rumsfeld advised.66  
“Quite apart from any illegal . . . dealings” revealed on the tapes, attorney Philip 
Areeda counseled, the “hair-down” discussions of politics there could “demean and 
embarrass the participants, the Republican Party, the Presidency, and . . . 
government generally.”67  Past Presidents had treated their records as their private 
property.68  Yet the tapes contained evidence courts might need and that Nixon 
might destroy.69  Nevertheless, White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt ruled that the 
tapes were Nixon’s personal property.70  Buzhardt then shaded the truth, leading 
Ford’s press secretary to believe he acted with Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski’s 
approval.71  The press secretary’s announcement that the Special Prosecutor had 
approved the decision to give Nixon the tapes created the impression the Ford 
Administration was working overtime to help Nixon and forced Buzhardt’s 
resignation.72 
When it came to trying to persuade Ford to end his predecessor’s ordeal, Haig 
and other Nixon loyalists proved to be equally zealous.  During Ford’s Vice 
President confirmation hearings, the committee asked him whether a President 
would have the power to prevent the criminal investigation and prosecution of 
Nixon.  Ford had responded: “I do not think the public would stand for it.”73  As the 
New York Times astutely observed, Ford’s answer did not preclude a pardon.74 
According to Ford, Haig first pointedly informed him “that a President does have 
authority to grant a pardon even before criminal action has been taken against an 
individual” in a conversation on the morning of August 1, eight days before he 
became President.75  When Ford recounted the conversation to aides, they told him 
the obvious: Haig might have proposed a deal by which Nixon would surrender the 
Presidency in exchange for Ford’s promise to pardon him, and Ford’s silence 
implied consent.76  Ford telephoned Haig in the presence of witnesses to say he 
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could make no commitments, and he had made none the previous morning.77  He did 
not expressly rule out a pardon (and he did not allude to a late night 1:00 a.m. 
telephone conversation he had with Haig the previous evening).78  
The pressure from Nixon’s men continued after Ford became President with a 
drumbeat of warnings that Nixon suffered from potentially life-threatening phlebitis 
and was depressed, even manic.79  Henry Kissinger told Ford that an indictment or a 
trial would have “grave physical and psychological repercussions” on Nixon and 
damage American credibility abroad.80  On August 27, 1974, Nixon loyalist Leonard 
Garment spoke with several journalists who despised Nixon, but now favored an 
early pardon.81  Garment then called on Abe Fortas, who had been a Supreme Court 
Justice until forced to resign from the bench because of one of Nixon’s Presidential 
“dirty tricks.”82  Should Nixon receive a pardon, Garment asked.83  It was 
“‘Ecclesiastes time,’” Fortas answered, “a time for . . . reconciliation, and not ‘the 
horror’ of a long state trial of the former President.”84  Perhaps others would also 
prove forgiving, Garment reasoned.85   
At Haig’s urging, Garment now drafted a memorandum for Haig and for 
Buzhardt’s successor as White House Counsel and Ford’s former law partner, Philip 
Buchen.86  A quick pardon would be greeted by “a national sigh of relief” and would 
exorcise Nixon’s ghost, freeing Ford to get on with governing.”87  At l0:30 a.m., 
after meeting with Ford to make the argument, Haig telephoned Garment to say, “It’s 
all set.”88 
Wishful thinking as yet, but the matter was closer to resolution after Ford’s first 
press conference four hours later.  Ford had prepared for it as if for doctoral orals, 
undergoing mock questions on issues ranging from the economy to the Soviets.89  
But, from the initial inquiry—did he believe Nixon should have immunity from 
                                                          
 
77
 WERTH, supra note 70, at 204-05. 
 
78
 Id. 
 
79
 John Herbers, Ford Aides Silent on Link of Pardon and Nixon Health, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
14, 1974, at 61 (reporting that Nixon’s son-in-law, David Eisenhower, had told Ford that 
Nixon was alternately despairing and euphoric). 
 
80
 HENRY KISSINGER, YEARS OF RENEWAL 39 (l999). 
 
81
 Leonard Garment, Annals of Law: The Hill Case, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 1989, at 
90, 107 [hereinafter “Garment, Annals”]. 
 
82
 Id. 
 
83
 Id. 
 
84
 Id. at 108. 
 
85
 Id. 
 
86
 Id. 
 
87
 Id. 
 
88
 Id. 
 
89
 FORD, supra note 13, at 157. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
358 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:349 
 
prosecution?—the media was interested in only Nixon’s fate.90  And as Ford 
subsequently realized, his answers seemed contradictory, sometimes suggesting that 
Nixon should receive immunity soon; at others, that he would let the legal process 
run its course.91  
After the press conference, Ford told Buchen to research the President’s pardon 
power: “Did [he] have the legal right to pardon someone who had not been indicted, 
or convicted, yet?”92  Buchen worked in secret and recalled feeling “scared” to “even 
to get a book out of the library [with] a ‘P’ on the front of it.”93  Even so, he easily 
found “enough law” to support a broad constitutional pardon power.94  The President 
could issue a pardon before indictment, and acceptance constituted an admission of 
guilt.95  The prospect of a pardon might solve another problem too, by encouraging 
Nixon to make a satisfactory disposition of those pesky records.  If Ford intervened, 
Buchen said that he should do so soon.96 
A week after the press conference, Special Prosecutor Jaworski also made it clear 
to Buchen that he did not want to indict Nixon if the President planned to pardon 
him.97 The publicity around Watergate, Jaworski told Ford, ensured that at least nine 
months must elapse after indictment before jury selection.98 
 In response, Ford decided that a properly negotiated pardon would bring his 
Administration out of Watergate’s shadow.  On the other hand, an indictment, 
followed by a trial, would not.  The decision was simple.  He confronted pressing 
domestic and foreign policy issues.  He did not want to be distracted by “lawyers’ 
endless arguments” about the tapes and records and journalists’ incessant questions 
about Nixon’s legal status.99  Ford said that Yale Law School taught him to see law 
as a tool of public policy, and while he “respected the tenet that no man should be 
above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon—and Watergate—behind us 
as quickly as possible.”100  Ford’s determination also reflected his long relationship 
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with his predecessor and his compassion for Nixon’s family.101  “I looked upon him 
as my personal friend,” Ford acknowledged, “[a]nd I had no hesitancy about 
granting the pardon, because I felt that we had this relationship.”102  Primarily, 
though, one adviser realized, the pardon was “a selfish act” to enable him “to get on 
with the business of the Ford presidency.”103  He was enjoying his work too much to 
share it with Nixon’s ghost, faced pressing issues of the economy and foreign policy, 
and “had to get the monkey off my back.”104 
Having reached a decision that seemed reasonable enough from Ford’s 
perspective, he then made several mistakes.  First, he refused to demand an 
agreement with respect to the papers and tapes from Nixon that Congress would 
accept.  Oddly, the President chose Benton Becker, an attorney under investigation 
for criminal misconduct, as his envoy to draft an agreement on the records for 
announcement with the pardon.105  Nixon’s representatives gave little to Becker 
during the negotiations; perhaps Haig tipped them off that Ford was not conditioning 
the pardon, as Buchen had recommended.106  Nixon pledged to deposit his papers 
and tapes in the National Archives.107  But, he retained exclusive power over access 
to them, the right to withdraw papers after three years had elapsed, and the guarantee 
that the tapes would be destroyed at his death or in a decade, whichever came first.108 
Nor did Ford demand an admission of guilt and repentance from Nixon.  Legally, 
acceptance of the pardon was an admission of guilt.  For years after, Ford carried in 
his wallet an excerpt from the Supreme Court’s decision in Burdick v. United 
States,109 declaring that a pardon “carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a 
confession of it.”110  But, Becker and others also let Nixon know that the President 
“welcome[d] a statement of contrition.”111  Ford blamed Haig when he did not get 
one, concluding that Haig let Nixon know “he didn’t have to make an outright 
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admission of guilt.”112  Predictably, Nixon acknowledged only having made 
“mistakes over Watergate,” a declaration so ambiguous it was counterproductive.113   
Finally, Ford made the decision as if he were still in Congress, where, in those 
days, the heat disappeared when the battle ended.114  Yet he also refused to lay the 
groundwork for the pardon by engaging in substantive discussions about it with key 
members of Congress and the Attorney General, who could have helped him justify 
it.115 
The “full, free and absolute pardon” that the President announced upon his return 
from church on Sunday, September 8, 1974,116 the same day daredevil biker Evel 
Knievel unsuccessfully attempted to rocket across Snake River, resulted in a public 
relations disaster.117  Evel Knievel received millions for the stunt, but there was no 
silver lining for Ford.118  It brought his honeymoon to a halt and left disillusionment 
and cynicism in its wake.119  Two weeks after the President announced the pardon, 
the media reported: “Outside the White House, some 250 pickets from George 
Washington University lofted a bed sheet with the words ‘PROMISE ME PARDON 
AND I’LL MAKE YOU PRESIDENT.’”120 
To be sure, the next generation would vindicate Ford.  (It is still too soon to say 
whether “history” has).  When he received the “Profile in Courage” award from the 
Kennedy Library in 2001, the citation dwelled at length on his decision to pardon 
Nixon.121  At Ford’s death, Newsweek insisted that the pardon “spared the nation an 
ordeal of recrimination and allowed the healing to begin.”122  But, I challenge the 
current conventional wisdom that the pardon was a good idea.  I think that the 
pardon contributed to cynicism about government; and, furthermore, it was the worst 
political blunder between Dean Acheson’s statement regarding South Korea being 
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outside the American defense perimeter and Bill Clinton’s refusal to settle the Paula 
Jones case, which led to his impeachment. 
Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s decision to pardon him were both controversial, 
and the pardon provoked a more negative reaction.  For one reason or another, 
Nixon’s decision to quit pleased two-thirds of those polled.123  Yet, to Ford’s 
“immense shock,”124 almost the same percentage thought the pardon wrong.125  
Researchers later found that “Ford's pardon of Nixon was more highly correlated 
with the drop in political trust than were any of the previous events of Watergate.”126 
Reporters were even angrier than the public.  In part, the pardon was their 
fault.127  The President would have thought he could “get away with it,” one 
admitted, because they had presented him as “irresistible.”128  Livid journalists “just 
turned a full 180 degrees and began to pound Ford and his lousy English muffins.”129  
They had transformed him from frog into Prince Charming just one month earlier 
and now they made him a frog all over again. 
Ford was worse off because suspicions he had made a deal with Haig raised 
questions about his integrity and decency.  Those suspicions were apparently 
groundless.  Ford’s conversations with Haig and Nixon probably led them to guess a 
pardon was forthcoming.130  But, no one has ever found evidence of a deal.131 
Even without a deal, though, the announcement of the pardon remained 
problematic.  Ford rationalized the pardon poorly, claiming it would heal the wounds 
of Watergate and that protracted litigation would stir “ugly passions.”132  Other 
trials—think those of Sacco and Vanzetti, Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs, for 
example—had stirred ugly passions.133  No one called off them.134 
And if Ford “[a]bove all . . . wanted it understood that my fundamental decision 
to grant a pardon had nothing to do with any sympathy I might feel for Nixon 
personally or any concern I might have for the state of his health,” as he insisted at 
the time, he was not thinking clearly.135  Moreover, if Ford wanted to defend the 
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pardon primarily by stressing the need “to heal the wounds throughout the United 
States,”136 as he insisted publicly at the time, he should have toned down the portion 
of his statement declaring that “serious allegations and accusations hang like a sword 
over our former President’s head, threatening his health as he tries to reshape his 
life.”137  This is especially true because journalists knew Nixon was playing golf and 
had seen him walking along the ocean in front of the California beachfront mansion 
to which he had been “exiled.”138  Additionally, Ford should not have insisted that, 
“Richard Nixon and his loved ones have suffered enough.”139 
Further, Ford’s timing was poor, guaranteeing that the pardon would become an 
issue in the upcoming Congressional elections.  Why not wait until afterwards, 
especially when he could calm his predecessor with a telephone call saying a pardon 
was forthcoming?140  More importantly, by acting when he did, Ford had “created 
the impression that he would have pardoned Nixon no matter what criminal charges 
might have been lodged against him or what evidence might have been presented to 
support them.  In effect, the President said that no crimes that Nixon might have 
committed would [have] preclud[ed] a pardon.”141  According to Senator Walter 
Mondale, a liberal Democrat, “no one wished the former President to go to jail, but 
to grant a pardon for unspecified crimes and acts is unprecedented in American 
history.”142  Presidential pardons typically specified the acts the accused had 
committed.143  Even though many did not want to see the former President sent to 
the country club prisons, to which so many of Nixon’s colleagues would be 
consigned, most sought a full accounting of the crimes he had allegedly 
committed.144 
An indictment would have allowed the facts and allegations to come out first.  
True, Jaworski feared that indictment, followed by a pardon, would undermine the 
rule of law.145  But Jaworski also knew the grand jury would indict Nixon “in a 
minute.”146  Most of Jaworski’s staff “wanted to indict and signal President Ford that 
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a pardon was in order . . . if Nixon would admit his guilt,” a recommendation 
Jaworski admitted “had some merit.”147 
And though evidence of rehabilitation almost always accompanied a pardon, in 
this instance there was none.148  One clergyman aptly described the tone of Nixon’s 
statement acknowledging the pardon: “Get this behind me so that I can get on with 
writing my memoirs and tell that I was right in the first place.”149  Ford should have 
required his predecessor to display repentance. 
Now Ford had placed himself in an untenable position.  On the one hand, he had 
damaged the principle of equal justice under law.  How could the trials of the 
Watergate minnows proceed when the whale swam free?  On the other, how could 
he free all the fish?150  When a Presidential spokesman suggested on September 10, 
1974, that pardons were “under study” for all former and prospective Watergate 
defendants, the ensuing uproar forced the White House to issue an immediate 
retraction.151 
And no matter how the public felt about the pardon, few praised the agreement 
allowing Nixon to control his records.  For example, when Buchen replied to a 
reporter’s question about “the right of history,” by saying that “the historians will 
protest, but I think historians cannot complain if evidence for history is not 
perpetuated which shouldn’t have been created in the first place,” he seemed to have 
taken leave of his senses.152  Historians were not the only ones who wanted to know 
whether Nixon had committed criminal acts.  Congress promptly abrogated the 
agreement by enacting the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservations Act, 
requiring delivery of the tapes to the complete “possession and control” of the 
Archivist of the United States and ordering the Archivist to give highest priority to 
processing those portions of the tapes and other records that would “provide the 
public with the full truth . . . of the abuses of governmental power popularly 
identified [as] ‘Watergate.’”153  (Nixon then sued to recover possession of the tapes, 
and the ensuing litigation tied up the release of most tapes for over two decades.)154 
Congress also asserted itself by creating a committee that directed the President 
to explain the pardon.  Prior Presidents had routinely declined to testify before a 
Congressional committee, but by October 1974, Ford was so frantic to defend the 
                                                          
 
147
 Id. at 268. 
 
148
 Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1141 (2000). 
 
149
 The Theology of Forgiveness, TIME, Sept. 23, l974, at 35. 
 
150
 Statement of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Sept. 11, 1974 (Box 
32, File: Nixon Pardon Correspondence (3), Buchen Files, Ford Library). 
 
151
 Press Release, Statement on Presidential Clemency and Pardons (Sept. 11, 1974), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4703. 
 
152
 Press Conference of Philip Buchen, Sept. 8, l974 (Box 35, File: Nixon Pardon--Press 
Conference (1) Sept. 8, 1974, Buchen Files, Ford Library).  
 
153
 KUTLER, supra note 44, at 592. 
 
154
 Tim Weiner, Historian Wins Long Battle To Hear More Nixon Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 1996, at 12. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
364 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:349 
 
pardon he agreed to appear.155  Representative Elizabeth Holtzman fired seven 
questions at Ford.  How could the President explain his failure to specify the crimes 
for which Nixon was pardoned, his refusal to require “any acknowledgement of 
guilt” from Nixon, his lack of consultation with the Attorney General, the 
“extraordinary haste in which the pardon was decided on and the secrecy with which 
it was carried out,” the accompanying agreement on the tapes, his choice of Becker 
as an envoy, and his failure to discuss the tapes agreement with Jaworski?156  
Returning to the theme of a deal, Holtzman referred to “suspicions . . . that the 
reasons for the pardon and the simultaneous tape agreement was to insure that the 
tape recordings between yourself and Richard Nixon never came out in public.”157   
The “most damaging aspects” of Ford's appearance, one aide reflected afterwards, 
“were the unanswered questions posed by Ms. Holtzman and the likely adverse 
public reaction to them.”158  
Amid all of the controversy over the pardon in 1974, the metaphor of Watergate 
as a national wound became stronger.  Ford reasoned that “[y]ou can't pull a bandage 
off slowly,”  but even he began to wonder whether he had just rubbed salt in it.159 
On November 5, 1974, the Democrats won forty seats in the House, giving them 
the two-thirds majority required to override Presidential vetoes; came just four votes 
shy of a two-thirds majority in the Senate; and swept the statehouses.160.  Democrats 
won even in twenty-one traditionally Republican suburban districts.161  The 
Republicans now held only thirteen governorships and four state legislatures.  Only 
thirty-eight percent of eligible voters cast a ballot.  Voters overwhelmingly marked 
their ballots for liberal and left-liberal Democrats who inveighed against Watergate 
and the pardon, along with the economy.162  Indeed, many believed that, despite 
Nixon’s victories in ’64 and ’72, the 1974 election returns represented “a great party 
                                                          
 
155
 James M. Cannon, Gerald Ford, in CHARACTER ABOVE ALL: TEN PRESIDENTS FROM 
FDR TO GEORGE BUSH (Robert A. Wilson ed., 1995), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/character/essays/ford.html. 
 
156
 Statements and Responses to Questions from Members of the House Judiciary Comm. 
Concerning the Pardon of Richard Nixon (Oct. 17, 1974), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4471. 
 
157
 Id.  
 
158
 Ken Lazarus, Memorandum for Phil Buchen, Oct. 17, 1974 (Box 34, File: Nixon 
Pardon, Hungate Subcommittee, Buchen Files, Ford Library).  
 
159
 FORD, supra note 13, at 173, 179; see also Jerald F. terHorst, President Ford and the 
Media, in THE FORD PRESIDENCY, supra note 52, at 209, 214. 
 
160
 JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ON CAPITOL HILL: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM CONGRESS AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES, 1948-2000, at 161 (2004).   
 
161
 DAVID S. BRODER, CHANGING OF THE GUARD: POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 349 
(1980). 
 
162
 ZELIZER, supra note 160, at 161; BRODER, supra note 161, at 349. 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/5
2010] GERALD FORD, THE NIXON PARDON 365 
 
landslide” for the Democrats.163  Across the spectrum of the Republican Party, there 
was despair.164 
The national conservative weekly, Human Events, had been grimly charting 
Ford’s move left all fall.165  Though the “[o]utrage [o]ver [p]ardon [s]hows [l]iberals 
[c]annot [b]e [a]ppeased,” it said, Ford didn’t seem to get it.166  Instead of arguing 
for a strong defense, he had “virtually promis[ed] conditional amnesty for deserters 
and draft dodgers!”167  He had “woo[ed] women’s libbers—endorsing the so-called 
Equal Rights Amendment and posing with an arm around far-out liberal Rep. Bella 
Abzug.”168  He had left the Black Caucus “all smiles.”169  The Rockefeller 
nomination was “most galling.”170  Human Events characterized the future of 
American conservatism as “extremely precarious.”171 
As the Republicans’ fortunes plummeted after Watergate, some Republicans 
thought their party should go the way of the Whigs.  One conservative went to 
Ronald Reagan and asked him to lead the new party.172  The Republican Presidential 
nomination in 1976, even if attainable, would require compromise with GOP power-
brokers and prove “worthless” because there were so few Republicans, he warned.173  
Reagan seemed intrigued.  He mused to the media, “I see the statements of 
disaffection of people in both parties,” and wondered, “[d]o you restore the 
confidence or do you change the name . . . ?”174  His backers reined him in, and the 
day after the 1974 midterm elections Reagan denied that the GOP was dead.175  He 
maintained that “the Republican Party represents basically the thinking of the people 
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of this country, if we can get that message across to the people.  I’m going to try to 
do that.”176 
That was an announcement that should have created consternation in the Ford 
White House, particularly since Reagan constantly badmouthed Ford.177  But Ford, 
Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney refused to take Reagan seriously despite 
warnings from staffers of future “severe rightwing problems.”178 
And so, Ford did not worry about conservative Republicans after the midterm 
elections.  The activities of what would be called the “New Right,”179 which had 
come into existence when Ford nominated Rockefeller and would take credit for 
Reagan’s 1980 election, remained below the White House radar screen.180  The New 
Right would not score its first legislative victory until the end of 1975 and would not 
find “the big issue” it searched for when it seized on the Panama Canal treaties in 
1977.181  The media ignored all conservative Republicans except for Reagan, whom 
it treated as a dimwit.182 
Consequently, one conservative historian said that the Republican Party in 1974 
seemed to be “sinking into oblivion.”183  In 1974, many of the politically powerful 
still spoke the language of liberalism and left-liberalism, and conservatism was in 
disarray.  It was between 1975 and 1979 that two-failed presidencies, the growth of 
neo-conservatism, the “New Right,” the religious right, anticommunism, and supply-
side economics laid the groundwork for the transformation of the United States.  
Those who contended later that the tide had turned right in the sixties and that 
Watergate was a bump in the road towards Reagan’s inevitable victory in 1980 
rewrote the past.184  The story of the growing power and appeal of conservatism and 
the Republican Party was more interesting than that.  It was a story of the seventies. 
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